Daniel Kahneman

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Daniel Kahneman
DanielKahneman.jpg
NationalityIsrael, American
OccupationAcademic
AwardsThe Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (2002)
Presidential Medal of Freedom (2013)
Academic background
Alma materUniversity of California, Berkeley
Academic work
DisciplinePsychology
Sub-disciplineBehavioral finance
InstitutionsPrinceton University
Notable ideasProspect theory
WebsiteHome page

Daniel Kahneman is Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs Emeritus at the Woodrow Wilson School, the Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology Emeritus at Princeton University. Kahneman's fields of study encompass economic psychology and experimental economics. In 2002 he was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.[1] Among other numerous awards, Kahneman was presented with the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2013.[2]

Papers

Kahneman is the author/coauthor of the following most cited works, listed from most to least cited. Kahneman frequently collaborated with Amos Nathan Tversky (March 16, 1937 - June 2, 1996) a noted cognitive and mathematical psychologist. Together they formulated prospect theory. The central insight of prospect theory revolves around loss-aversion, as people value gains and losses differently and, as such, will base decisions on perceived gains rather than perceived losses.[3]

Year Study
1979 Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk[4]
1974 Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases[5]
1981 The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice[6]
1992 Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty[7]
1973 Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability[8]
1973 On the psychology of prediction[9]
1991 Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model[10]
1991 Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias[11]
1990 Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem[12]
1983 Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment[13]
1986 Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market[14]

Books

  • Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p. 512. ISBN 978-0374275631.
  • Gilovich, T.; Griffin, D.; Kahneman, D., eds. (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 880. ISBN 978-0521792608.
  • Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A., eds. (2000). Choices, values and frames. New York: Cambridge University Press and the Russell Sage Foundation. p. 848. ISBN 978-0521621724.
  • Kahneman, D.; Diener, E.; Schwarz, N., eds. (1999). Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p. 605. ISBN 978-0871544247.
  • Kahneman, D.; Slovic, P.; Tversky, A., eds. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 555. ISBN 978-0521240642.
  • Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. p. 240. ISBN 978-0130505187.

References

  1. Facts , Nobelprize.org. Retrieved February 29, 2016
  2. President Obama Names Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipients, Retrieved February 29, 2016
  3. "Prospect Theory". Investopedia. Retrieved March 1, 2016.
  4. Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (March 1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society: The Econometric Society. pp. 263–291.
  5. Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (September 1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science Volume 185 (4157): American Association for the Advancement of Science. pp. 1124–1131.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  6. Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (January 1980). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science Volume 211 (4481): American Association for the Advancement of Science. pp. 453–458.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  7. Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (October 1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Volume 5 (4): Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 297–323.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  8. Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel (September 1975). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology Volume 5 (2): Academic Press. pp. 207–232.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  9. Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (July 1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, Volume 80(4): American Psychological Association. pp. 237–251.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  10. Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (November 1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics Volume 106 (4): The MIT Press. pp. 1039–1061.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  11. Kahneman, Daniel; Knetsch, Jack L.; Thaler, Richard H. (January 1991). Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias. The Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 5 (1): American Economic Association. pp. 193–206.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  12. Kahneman, Daniel; Knetsch, Jack L.; Thaler, Richard H. (December 1990). Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy: The University of Chicago Press. pp. 1325–1348.
  13. Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (October 1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review Volume 90 (4): American Psychological Association. pp. 293–315.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  14. Kahneman, Daniel; Knetsch, Jack L.; Thaler, Richard H. (September 1986). Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. he American Economic Review: The American Economic Association. pp. 728–741.

External links

Further reading