McQ wrote: ↑Mon Jun 20, 2022 11:52 pm
nigel_ht wrote: ↑Mon Jun 20, 2022 10:10 am
McQ wrote: ↑Sun Jun 19, 2022 10:24 pm
When will the 4% rule fail? What is the combination of circumstances required? As willthrill81 pointed out, it has failed outside the US before (detailed case studies here:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ... id=4001986). But why? How did the course of these markets differ from the US?
The primary failure cases are WWI, WWII, going communist and Nikkei crash.
Nigel_ht, I would not expect you to read in detail a paper when a preliminary scan indicated that it had nothing new to offer you.
Had you done so, you would have seen that there were no WW II examples in the paper (those were all ruled out as cheap shots, along with civil war and defeat in war and also revolutionary overthrow, e.g., going communist.)
The only WW I examples were of a victor (UK) and a neutral (Sweden). Retirees in each case would have done better if they had supplemented their domestic stock market with a world stock index investment.
An international stock index would have helped the US investor in 1965, not so much in 1910. YMMV.
The most interesting findings in the paper, to me, were the poor results for the post-1960 Italian and French retirees. No world war. No civil war. No revolution. Just high inflation plus weak stock and bond returns for a long time.
Part of my job is peer reviewing journals. I read pretty fast although, yes, I didn't read all 60 pages in detail. Only the parts relevant to your comment: "
As willthrill81 pointed out, it has failed outside the US before (detailed case studies here: ... But why? How did the course of these markets differ from the US?". The RMD section at the beginning I perused quickly and then went back to re-read pertinent sections when necessary.
Yes, WWII was not in the scope of your paper but by using 1910 world portfolio it includes the European market in WWI which would include both victors and losers including those that ceased to exist after the war (Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire) except as reduced successor states.
Given your comment about the 1910 not being a particularly fair test on page 23...why did you spend 3 pages presenting it?
The next example is the UK...in 1910.
While the UK didn't lose the war it lost 887,858 troops. 744,000 from the British Isles (43m total population in 1911). There were an additional 1.6M wounded. The empire lost a total of about 949K to 1.1M troops. Deaths as a % of the population was around 1.7-2%. Total losses in human capital when you count the wounded would be higher.
The high inflation you noted was due to spending about 25% of their GDP on the war.
Now the US spent 40% of GDP in WWII but again...if we enter a World War, barely win and suffer 6M dead then yes, all bets are off. Taiwan isn't likely to be that kind of war.
It is really hard for 2022 US to suffer an existential crisis that isn't either self-inflicted or involves nuclear weapons.. I suppose that asteroidal impact or other large natural disasters also apply. Anyone attempting to mitigate for the Yellowstone super volcano exploding?
Sweden in 1912. Still within that WWI timeframe.
Sweden's economy was deeply impacted by WWI when German subs targeted neutral shipping in 1917 (280 Swedish merchant ships were lost in the war) and by unrestricted Allied blockade starting in 1915 and allied embargoes of neutrals to keep Germany from getting food and war material. Sweden went from having an export surplus to dramatically less trade overall (both import and export). Trade as a percentage of GDP was halved after 1915 becoming more regional and less global. Given that about 30% of government revenue was from taxes on import/export, which cratered, and increased military spending (because there's a global war going on not too far away) and its not surprising that even neutral countries struggled. Poor harvests in 1917 and Allied blockades lead to food shortages in Sweden and there were large food riots. Toward the end of the war coal could no longer be imported from Germany so there were also fuel shortages on top of that.
So your 77 year old Swedish retiree was hungry and cold in 1917 because of the war and, if hale enough, was possibly protesting in the streets.
To recap...a country that depended a lot on foreign imports lost a sizable portion of their merchant marine (17% of their tonnage) to war, suffered from diminished trade because of blockade (from war) and had a famine/poor harvest.
Yep...that leads to a bad scenario including high sustained inflation. Neutrality mitigated a portion of repercussions of the war but WWI still had very large detrimental effects on Sweden. This isn't normal SORR...and not very applicable to the US.
Post 1960s France was when the British and French realized they were no longer tier 1 powers after the Suez and from losing their colonies. Empires that lose their colonies tend to do poorly for a while. France lost Lebanon in 1943 and Syria in 1945. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam by 1954, Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa in 1960, Algeria in 1962 (after 8 years of war). Not a particularly stellar time for France.
And the Algerian war was significant...400,000 French troops were in Algeria by 1956 and 1.5m mobilized on the French side. It was a significant cause for the fall of the Fourth Republic in 1958. In April 1961 there was the coup attempt against de Gaulle. Not entirely "no civil war" even it mostly happened in Algeria...for France the Algerian War was the final fall of their empire after 15 years of rearguard wars and decline.
And arguably the cause of the fall of the French Empire was WWII. They started losing colonies during the war and never stopped until their empire was gone.
The equivalent scenario for the US is to start losing states and heading we're back down to our original 13 states. Those are our colonial holdings...yes, if this starts happening things will go poorly.
As a note...our original 13 colonies were about 865K sq miles. In comparison, France is about 211K sq miles. Folks tend to forget how big we are in comparison to European countries...another aspect of how we differ.
Italy...well...it's had a troubled economic history.
So back to the context:
"
As willthrill81 pointed out, it has failed outside the US before (detailed case studies here: ... But why? How did the course of these markets differ from the US?".
My answer is:
They differ a lot from the US.
The primary failure cases remain WWI, WWII, going communist and Nikkei crash.
Your paper adds:
Being Italy. Which I would claim is comes under the heading of "differs a lot from the US."
When Bretton Woods and Suez Crisis happens to us, all bets are off. I say that pretty often and probably even in this thread...and it COULD happen to the US fairly rapidly if we have 2 world wars and a Great Depression. Decolonization is unlikely without a civil war.
So will we see 4% fail in the future without the collapse of the American Empire? Perhaps...but not by very much because large failure likely means we have already lost reserve currency and superpower status. The latter is a huge trump card...one we don't ever really use as a trump card because we don't face external existential crises...but if we ever did...